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INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v.
Heller1 and McDonald v. City of Chicago2 were hailed as watershed
moments for the gun rights movement as they resolved two major
uncertainties, these cases also created scores of additional important
questions regarding the scope of the protections that the Second
Amendment affords. No one currently has any firm idea about who the
Second Amendment protects, what the Second Amendment protects,
where those protections exist, and—to the extent that they do exist—
why they exist. Without question, we are at the very beginning of
Second Amendment jurisprudence; the precise rights guaranteed by the
Second Amendment will be debated, litigated, appealed, interpreted, redebated, re-litigated and re-appealed for the next generation. There
likely will be important Supreme Court opinions written on the Second
Amendment by Justices who currently are still in high school, choosing
prom dresses, or learning how to drive.
In the face of this uncertainty, an old idea, formerly championed by
quite a different side of the political spectrum, may be of some use to
the pro gun lobby in its desire to expand—or at least define the scope
of—gun rights. A consequence of Heller’s holding that the right to
bear arms is an individual as opposed to a collective right is that state
constitutions can at least theoretically confer greater protections of
individual gun rights than the federal Constitution—though state
constitutions cannot go below the guarantees afforded by the Second
Amendment.3 The idea that the federal Constitution creates a floor
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
3. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“Our reasoning . . . does
not . . . limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign
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but not a ceiling for individual rights was called “the new judicial
federalism” when it took root in the mid-twentieth century.4
This Article, which is based on my portion of the panel discussion
at the Fordham Urban Law Journal Symposium on Gun Control and
the Second Amendment on March 9, 2012, begins with an overview of
the post-Heller/McDonald world, arguing that there is no consensus
on what rights the Second Amendment confers and analyzing the
possible scopes of the Second Amendment. The second part of this
Article examines the new judicial federalism to see if there is any
potential for state constitutions to define, in a more substantial way,
which rights are conferred by state constitutional gun rights
provisions; and examines how, in the face of the Supremacy Clause, a
state could confer greater individual gun rights than the federal
Constitution.
I. A FINE MESS: THE POST-HELLER/MCDONALD WORLD
Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heller has been analyzed
ad nauseam in the popular press, in law review articles, and by the
lower courts,5 there are a few key points that bear repeating. First,
although Heller is, and will remain, the lodestar for Second
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court in essence decided one—and
only one—major issue: it determined that the right to keep and bear
arms is an individual—not a collective—right. Beyond that, the Court
did little to delineate the scope of that individual right to bear arms.

right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution.”); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975);
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, The Silver Anniversary of New Judicial Federalism,
66 ALB. L. REV. 797 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(considering the new District of Columbia regulatory scheme for firearms under
Heller); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (offering an
extensive analysis of Heller, and upholding a ban on firearms in federal parklands,
without deciding whether such parklands are “sensitive places” under Heller); United
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding the federal ban on felons in
possession following an analysis of Heller’s dicta); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding a federal ban on firearm possession by individuals
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, based on analysis of Heller and
analysis of the history behind felon and misdemeanant possession laws); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (upholding federal law against
possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers, noting “we cannot be certain
that the possession of unmarked firearms in the home is excluded from the right to
bear arms”).
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In reaching the conclusion that the Second Amendment’s right to
keep and bear arms is an individual right, Justice Scalia attempts to
chart the purpose and “core” of the Second Amendment. The
opinion, at the outset, analyzes the use of the term “the people” in
the Second Amendment and concludes that its use leads to the
“strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised
individually and belongs to all Americans.”6 The opinion gradually
buttresses this conclusion with additional historical evidence,
including analogous state provisions,7 drafting history,8 and various
post-ratification sources.9
In attempting to determine the “core” of the Second Amendment,
Justice Scalia engages in a classic process of selective10 reasoning.
Starting with his “strong presumption that the Second Amendment
right is exercised individually,”11 he then concludes that “the Second
Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.”12 The opinion then states that “the most natural reading
of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment is to ‘have weapons,’” and
that certain historical sources support the idea that keeping arms was
meant to be “an individual right unconnected with militia service,”13
and that in other historical sources “‘bear arms’ was unambiguously
used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized
militia.”14
Taken together, Justice Scalia concludes that the Second
Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry
weapons in case of confrontation.”15 In a pivotal passage of the
opinion, Justice Scalia writes, “the inherent right of self-defense has

6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
7. See id. at 600–03.
8. See id. at 603–05.
9. See id. at 605–19.
10. As opposed to deductive or inductive reasoning.
11. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. It is perhaps worth noting that defining the Second
Amendment right as a “right of the people” may, a fortiori, lead to the conclusion
that it is not limited only to “Americans.” See, e.g., United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
an alien outside of the United States, but acknowledging that “the people” refers to
persons who are part of a “national community” but need not necessarily be citizens).
12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 584.
15. Id. at 592.
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been central to the Second Amendment right.”16 In this light, the
District of Columbia’s prohibitions never stood a chance, as they
“extend[ed], moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of
self, family, and property is most acute.”17 The opinion concludes that
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most
preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of
one’s home and family,’ [i.e., a handgun] would fail constitutional
muster.”18
Justice Scalia takes this point even further, stating that because
“handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for
self-defense in the home, . . . a complete prohibition of their use is
invalid.”19 Putting aside (for the moment) the selective historical
analysis and the fact that handguns were not in popular use in the
founding era and would have been radically impractical as
instruments for defending homes and families, the holding in the
Heller case is actually quite narrow:
[T]he District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the
Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any
lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate
self-defense. Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the
exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him
to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the
home.20

The majority reasons that, because the District of Columbia
prevented Dick Heller from having an operable handgun in his home
for the purposes of self-defense, it violated the Second Amendment.
But this assessment says very little about what the Second
Amendment actually means; it only defines one extreme case on the
margins.21 In fact, the Heller Court makes clear that even this narrow
holding is not a complete and correct statement of the law. Rather,

16. Id. at 628.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 628–29 (footnote and citation omitted). Note that, although the opinion
makes clear that the District’s handgun ban would fail under any standard of
scrutiny, it does not say which standard is appropriate.
19. Id. at 629.
20. Id. at 635.
21. But cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (“[I]n
[Heller], we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear
arms for the purpose of self defense . . . .”).
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the majority opinion excludes at least two areas from even this “core”
Second Amendment coverage:
Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.22

This statement is, itself, problematic. For example, bans on
possession by convicted felons did not come into existence until the
twentieth century and are therefore not clearly long-standing.23
Indeed, as my distinguished co-panelist Nelson Lund has noted,
Justice Scalia throws out this statement almost as an afterthought,
without giving any real consideration to which of these “longstanding” restrictions should actually be permitted under the Second
Amendment.24
Second, following the precedent in United States v. Miller,25 the
Court reaffirmed that prohibitions on “dangerous and unusual”
weapons are permitted.26 Justice Scalia admits that this seems to be a
significant departure from the Second Amendment as the Framers
likely conceived it, insofar as it was believed to enable “the body of
all citizens capable of military service . . . [to] bring the sorts of lawful
weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.”27
22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
23. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (citing C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 708 (2009)). In fact, the first time a ban on all “felons”
possessing firearms arose only in 1961, when Congress amended the Federal
Firearms Act of 1938. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a
Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009). The 1961 amendment forbade
felons from receiving any firearm in interstate commerce, and in 1968, Congress
extended the prohibition to include “any firearm that ever had traveled in interstate
commerce.” Id. It is interesting to note that “longstanding” restrictions from 1961
are honored, while the District’s handgun ban—enacted only 14 years later—was not.
24. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (or Are There More?)
in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487, 501–05 (2011).
25. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
26. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
27. Id. It also bears mention that these limitations were lifted by Justice Alito’s
plurality opinion in McDonald, and therefore should apply in equal force to the
states. However, because Justice Alito did little more than echo the limitations on
the Second Amendment that were listed in Heller, McDonald does not require
independent consideration on these issues. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Second Amendment does
not protect “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
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In fact, by upholding the Miller rule, Justice Scalia exposes a
fundamental weakness in the Court’s reasoning: the Court has now
entirely de-coupled the right to bear arms from the prefatory clause
of the Second Amendment. Indeed, “[t]he opinion itself even
stipulated that its construction frustrated the purpose of the prefatory
clause.”28 It is clear that, at the very least, the Supreme Court was not
basing its holding on the actual full text of the Second Amendment.
It is this divorce from the actual language of the amendment itself
that makes it all but impossible to predict what the future holds for
gun rights. As my co-panelist Adam Winkler observed, lower courts
are typically not doing historical analyses of the meaning of the
Second Amendment.29 This may be because the Supreme Court
made it clear that adequate clues are simply unavailable to give us a
clear idea of how the Second Amendment could apply in the twentyfirst century.30 Instead, we have to look for clues in the text of the
Heller opinion itself.
A. What Is the Scope of the Second Amendment Post-Heller ?
This brings us to the first piece of a thought experiment. If the
rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment are not tethered to the
actual text of the Second Amendment, what is the nature of that
right?
One possibility, based on the broadest possible reading of Heller,
is:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
This version (Scope I) is simply the operative clause, stripped of
the limitations of its prefatory clause and a comma. This reading is
suggested at points in the Heller decision itself; Justice Scalia’s
opinion expressly rejects the importance of the prefatory clause as a
limit on the right described by the Second Amendment, instead
“begin[ning] our textual analysis with the operative clause” and only
later considering “the prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of

whatsoever and for whatever purpose” and that therefore “incorporation does not
imperil every law regulating firearms”).
28. John Zulkey, Note, The Obsolete Second Amendment: How Advances in
Arms Technology Have Made the Prefatory Clause Incompatible with Public Policy,
2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 213, 214 (2010).
29. Fordham Urban Law Journal, Gun Control and the Second Amendment—2
of 3 (Mar. 9, 2012), http://vimeo.com/40479020.
30. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”31
Moreover, having adopted an interpretation that does not square
neatly with the prefatory clause, Justice Scalia explains the
discrepancy away, noting that “the fact that modern developments
have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the
protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.”32 The
criticism in Justice Stevens’ dissent—that “the Court simply ignores
the preamble” of the Amendment33—has been widely recognized.34
In the wake of Heller, several courts have interpreted the Second
Amendment as providing a broader (though still undefined) right
rather than simply providing the right to possess a firearm in the
home for self-defense purposes. For example, the Seventh Circuit in
Ezell v. City of Chicago held that the Second Amendment prevented
Chicago from enacting a ban on firearm ranges within the city limits.35
Although the court could have ruled that the combination of
Chicago’s (newly adopted) requirement that any gun owner receive
live-range instruction and the ban on firing ranges was a roundabout
way to prevent gun ownership that was “too clever by half,”36 the
judges went further and unanimously found that the Second
Amendment prevents a ban on firing ranges themselves, regardless of
the right of an individual to possess a firearm.37 Indeed, the majority
ruled that a “right to possess firearms for protection implies a
corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their
use.”38 Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not just recognize a right to selfdefense in the home, but a right to keep and bear arms that is broad
enough to include a right to gain proficiency in that right.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling
Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 267–68 (2009) (“Justice Scalia . . . dismissed quickly
the possibility that the prefatory clause could restrict the operative clause, and
concluded that the right in the operative clause need only be ‘consistent with the
announced purpose’ in the prefatory clause.”); Zulkey, supra note 28, at 214 (“The
opinion itself even stipulated that its construction frustrated the purpose of the
prefatory clause.”).
35. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011).
36. Id. at 711 (Rovner, J., concurring).
37. See id. at 704 (majority opinion) (“The right to possess firearms for protection
implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use . . . .”);
id. at 712 (Rovner, J., concurring) (“A complete ban on live ranges in the City,
therefore, is unlikely to withstand scrutiny under any standard of review.”).
38. Id. at 704 (majority opinion).
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The Seventh Circuit relied on First Amendment principles to
determine whether the right had been “infringed.” It noted that the
ability to visit a firing range outside the city was no more acceptable
an alternative than a prohibition on the “exercise of a free-speech or
religious-liberty right within its borders on the rationale that those
rights may be freely enjoyed in the suburbs.”39 And, insofar as the
firing-range ban prevented law-abiding citizens “from engaging in
target practice in the controlled environment of a firing range,” the
law was found to be “a serious encroachment on the right to maintain
proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the meaningful
exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.”40 This
language essentially says nothing more than that the right to keep and
bear arms—as broadly construed—has been infringed, even though
the “core right” of self-defense in the home may not have been.41
Although Scope I would be the preferred reading of the Second
Amendment for many gun rights advocates, it cannot be what Heller
actually stands for. Indeed, Heller itself noted several instances in
which the “right of the people to keep and bear arms” could be
infringed. Heller expressly allowed not only infringement, but
outright prohibitions, on the “weapons that are most useful in
military service—M-16 rifles and the like”—in light of “the historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’”42 In addition, the Court stated that barring possession by
certain persons, or carrying in certain places, was “presumptively
lawful.”43
Although Ezell explained these exceptions as indistinguishable
from certain categories of speech that—like “obscenity, defamation,
fraud, [and] incitement—are categorically ‘outside the reach’ of the
First Amendment,”44 it also noted that those First Amendment
exceptions were derived from “history and legal tradition.”45 In
contrast, as noted above, the two categories excluded from the “core”

39. Id. at 697.
40. Id. at 708.
41. Although, as the court noted, “[t]hat the City conditions gun possession on
range training is an additional reason to closely scrutinize the range ban.” Id. There
is, therefore, a basis to have found that the “core right” was also infringed; however,
the court did not so find in light of its much broader holding.
42. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 627 n.26.
44. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011).
45. Id. (citing United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010)).
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Second Amendment coverage46 that Justice Scalia enumerated have
very little basis in history, and, according to some scholars, were made
up from whole cloth.47 Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that the
Court truly applied the Second Amendment as written, but merely
stripped it of its prefatory clause. And certainly the Court’s analysis
of the “core” right as being one of self-defense in the home seems to
be its own limiting function.
Another possible reading of the Second Amendment might be the
following:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms, for the purposes of
personal self-defense, shall not be substantially infringed.
This possible scope of the Second Amendment (Scope II) entirely
strips the relevance of the prefatory clause, and squares neatly with
Heller’s assertion that the “core” purpose of the Second Amendment
is self-defense.48 In fact, this version of the Amendment closely
resembles the gun rights granted in several state constitutions.49
Depending on which infringements one considers “substantial,”
there are several cases that can be interpreted to rely on this reading
of the Second Amendment. United States v. Marzzarella is a notable
example.50 In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit upheld a federal
prohibition on the possession of a firearm where the serial number
had been obliterated from the firearm.51 The court found that
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny was appropriate because the
“burden imposed by the law does not severely limit the possession of

46. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356–68 (2009) (demonstrating a lack of
historical backing for each element of Justice Scalia’s dicta).
48. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
49. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“That every citizen has a right to bear arms
in defense of himself and the state.”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Every citizen has a
right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6
(“Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the
state.”).
50. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
51. Id. The law at issue in Marzzarella prohibited the transportation, shipment, or
receipt of any firearm “which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number
removed, obliterated, or altered or to possess or receive any firearm which has had
the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and
has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18
U.S.C. § 922(k) (2006). The Marzzarella court found that the statute, rather than
regulating firearm possession per se, regulated only “the manner in which persons
may lawfully exercise their Second Amendment rights.” 614 F.3d at 97.
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firearms”52 and the intent behind the provision “was not to limit the
ability of persons to possess any class of firearms.”53 Moreover, the
court noted that, “[b]ecause unmarked weapons are functionally no
different from marked weapons, § 922(k) does not limit the
possession of any class of firearms.”54
Interestingly, in arriving at its holding, the Third Circuit did not
interpret Heller to specifically protect the possession of firearms for selfdefense in the home.
Rather, the court interpreted the right
undergirding Heller as being potentially much broader, noting only that
the Supreme Court “declined to fully define the scope of the right to
possess firearms.”55 Nevertheless, the court essentially found that the
District of Columbia regulation at issue in Heller had failed strict
scrutiny because a law that prevented a person from possessing firearms
even in his own home would necessarily fail under “any form of meansend scrutiny applicable to assess the validity of limitations on
constitutional rights.”56 Thus the Third Circuit’s reasoning and its
holding were consistent with a broad right to bear arms for self-defense,
subject only to reasonable limitations.
There are numerous other cases that can be interpreted to approve a
broad right to self-defense, only subject to certain reasonable limitations.
For example, in 2011, the Middle District of Georgia found that banning
guns in places of worship was presumptively permissible under
intermediate scrutiny, adding that the regulation might also be a
permissible restriction on carrying in “sensitive places,” under Justice
Scalia’s dicta in Heller.57 Kuck v. Danaher58 also may demonstrate a
similar view of the Second Amendment. In Kuck, the District of
Connecticut found that the Second Amendment rights of two individuals
were not violated when one individual’s firearms permit was temporarily
revoked following an arrest for breach of the peace, and when the other
was denied a renewed permit after he refused to submit a copy of his
passport or birth certificate.59

52. 614 F.3d at 97.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 98–99.
55. Id. at 89.
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1318–20 (M.D.
Ga. 2011).
58. 822 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Conn. 2011).
59. Id. at 126, 129-30.
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Similarly, Woollard v. Sheridan recently struck down a Maryland
law for infringing on a right to bear arms outside of the home, and
therefore could be seen as having been decided under this version of
the Second Amendment.60 The court relied on the reasoning of Judge
Niemeyer in United States v. Masciandaro, who suggested that,
“[c]onsistent with the historical understanding of the right to keep
and bear arms outside the home, the Heller Court’s description of its
actual holding also implies that a broader right exists” outside the
home.61 Based on that conception of the Second Amendment, the
district court invalidated a Maryland requirement that an applicant
for a carry permit demonstrate a “good and substantial reason” why
he requires a gun, finding that the regulation was no more than “a
rationing system.”62 Accordingly, the court held, “A citizen may not
be required to offer a ‘good and substantial reason’ why he should be
permitted to exercise his rights. The right’s existence is all the reason
he needs.”63
Arguably, however, Scope II would not support the total denial of
the right to bear military-grade weapons; but the Heller majority
expressly countenanced that restriction.64 Thus, Scope II cannot be
the reading of the Second Amendment that Justice Scalia was
applying.
Yet another reading of the Second Amendment might proceed as
follows:
The right of the people to keep and bear those arms that are popular
or preferable for self-defense in the home, for that purpose, shall not
be infringed, notwithstanding the power of the government to
restrict use and ownership of military weapons.
This reading (Scope III) is substantially narrower than Scope I and
Scope II. Scope III seems to be a little closer to the interpretation
that Justice Scalia relied on in Heller, though it requires an express
repudiation of the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment.65 First
of all, it may provide the closest fit with the right that Heller

60. Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (D. Md. 2012).
61. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011).
62. Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
63. Id. at 475.
64. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–82, 626–27 (2008).
65. See Zulkey, supra note 28, at 214 (“The prefatory clause was drafted with the
purpose of arming the populace of its time to fulfill a military role.”); see also
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 654
(1989) (discussing the Second Amendment’s link to militia service).
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described. As explained in Heller itself, “the inherent right of selfdefense has been central to the Second Amendment right,” and “the
home [is] where the need for defense of self, family, and property is
most acute.”66
Second, this is the only reading of the Amendment so far
considered that takes account of how Justice Scalia considered
various classes of weapons. The Court put significant stock into the
fact that, “[w]hatever the reason, handguns are the most popular
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a
complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”67
The opinion
nevertheless found that a prohibition on “the carrying of ‘dangerous
and unusual weapons,’” of a type “not typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns”
as well as “M-16 rifles and the like,” was permissible under the
Second Amendment.68
Although some scholars have argued that this comports neatly with
how the Framers would have understood the Second Amendment,69
this is certainly not clear from the text of the actual Second
Amendment, nor does it have a clear historical basis.70 Indeed, the
annual returns of the Militia of the United States suggest just the
opposite—that several siege or artillery weapons and similar
“weapons of mass destruction” by the standards of the day, such as
cannons and howitzers, were classified as “arms” and regularly held
in private hands.71

66.
67.
68.
69.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 625–27.
See, e.g., Richard A. Allen, What Arms?: A Textualist’s View of the Second
Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 191, 203 (2008) (“In the case of the Second
Amendment, however, it is not reasonable to conclude that the Framers used and
understood the term ‘arms’ with the purpose and intent that it would encompass all
the fearsome weapons that modern technology enables individuals to wield today,
like Stinger missiles, rocket propelled grenades, .50-caliber machine guns and the
like.”) (emphasis added).
70. See Lund, supra note 47, at 1362–67.
71. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Message Transmitting Returns of the Militia,
March 22, 1804, in 1 MILITARY AFFAIRS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF
THE FIRST TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS, INCLUSIVE:
COMMENCING MARCH 3, 1789, AND ENDING MARCH 3, 1819, at 171 (Walter Lowrie &
Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1832), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/
ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html [hereinafter MILITARY AFFAIRS] (noting two howitzers
in South Carolina and dozens of cannons of assorted sizes throughout the United
States); Thomas Jefferson, Message Transmitting Returns of the United States’
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The primary concern for the right to self-defense in the home
appears to have animated the majority in United States v.
Masciandaro.72 Masciandaro considered the validity of a regulation
barring “‘carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle’
within national park areas.”73 In finding that the Second Amendment
did not protect Masciandaro’s right to carry a loaded gun in his car,
the majority noted that “[t]here may or may not be a Second
Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but we have no

idea what those places are, what the criteria selecting them should be,
what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a
number of other questions.”74 This squares neatly with the notion
that the right to bear arms may only apply in the home.
Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2011 expressly adopted a
similar reading of the Second Amendment in Williams v. State, in which
it upheld Maryland’s “good and substantial reason” requirement for a
carry permit, on the grounds that the regulatory scheme was “outside
the scope of the Second Amendment” because it contained an
“exception permitting home possession.”75 According to the Maryland
court, “it is clear that prohibition of firearms in the home was the

Militia, February 28, 1805, in 1 MILITARY AFFAIRS 184, 187 (same); Thomas
Jefferson, Message Transmitting a Statement of the Militia of the United States,
April 11, 1806, in 5 MILITARY AFFAIRS 199, 203 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney
eds., 1860) (same); Thomas Jefferson, Message Transmitting Returns of the Militia of
the Several States, February 11, 1807, in 1 MILITARY AFFAIRS 210, 213 (same). At
the time, howitzers were designed and used to inflict maximum damage and break
enemy lines and entrenchment. See JEROME A. GREEENE, THE GUNS OF
INDEPENDENCE: THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, 1781, at 383 (2005) (“[Howitzers] could
throw bombs at trajectories lower than mortars and higher than cannon, and were
ideal for discharging bombs at an enemy en ricochet in the same manner as
cannonballs. Indeed, their use in firing bombs in this fashion endeared them to siege
artillerists of the 18th century. The bomb, or howitzer, ‘hopps along the ground, and
drops just over the enemy’s parapet, destroying them where they thought themselves
most secure.’ Moreover, the howitzer was a light weapon and used in a short-trailed,
two-wheel carriage. Thus, it was highly mobile, and could be used to fire grapeshot
and cannister shot besides bombs.” (footnotes omitted)).
72. 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
73. Id. at 460 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2011)).
74. Id. at 475 (emphasis added). But see id. at 468 (Niemeyer, J., writing
separately) (stating that a “plausible reading of Heller” provides a “constitutional
right to possess a loaded handgun for self-defense outside the home”).
75. Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1178 (Md. 2011); see also Hightower v. City of
Boston, 822 F. Supp. 2d 38, 63 (2011) (upholding a denial of a carry permit under
Boston’s stringent regulatory scheme because, although the denial “may have some
marginal impact on Hightower’s ability to use a gun to defend herself outside her
home, it has no impact on her ability to defend hearth and home or to defend herself
at home, which she can do adequately with a” lesser license).
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gravamen of the certiorari questions in both Heller and McDonald and
their answers.”76
In addition, the 2011 opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in
Heller II clearly contemplates a similar understanding of the specific
types of weapons that the Second Amendment protects. In Heller II,
the court looked skeptically at an attempt by the District of Columbia
to ban assault weapons and large-capacity magazines.77 Indeed, the
majority in that case rejected the notion that such a ban was
longstanding and entitled to a presumption of validity.78 Although
the court upheld the ban on such weapons, it nevertheless gave
several pages worth of consideration to whether those weapons
qualified as “dangerous and unusual,” or were, in fact, “‘in common
use . . .’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.”79
As explained below, however, this reading of the Second
Amendment cannot fully explain all of the things that have followed
from Heller, suggesting that perhaps an even more precise wording
would better explain Justice Scalia’s holding. For example:
Each person has the right to keep and bear .22-caliber revolvers
(and similar firearms)—those being particularly popular weapons for
self-defense—within the confines of his or her own dwelling for the
purpose of personal self-defense, provided that he or she is not a
lunatic, drug user, fugitive, or convicted criminal.
At first glance, the phrasing of this interpretation (Scope IV) seems,
perhaps, absurdly narrow. It is, however, the only interpretation that
follows, necessarily, from the holding in Heller. Scope IV supports the
regulation of multiple classes of weapons and is certainly consistent
with some of the more restrictive gun cases that followed Heller, such
as Kachalsky v. Cacace, which upheld a regime in New York that
requires a permit even to possess a handgun in the home.80
In addition, Scope IV echoes Justice Scalia’s dicta that it is
permissible to bar possession of guns—potentially for life—by certain
persons, and particularly by those who have been convicted of a
felony.81 Indeed, an overwhelming number of post-Heller cases have

76. Williams, 10 A.3d at 1177 (emphasis added).
77. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
81. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2006).

DE LEEUW_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1464

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

2/6/2013 10:46 PM

[Vol. XXXIX

expressly upheld the ban on possession by convicted felons,82 drug
users,83 and those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors.84 The
courts’ willingness to assume that Second Amendment rights may be
wholly denied to certain persons based upon their criminal history is
nearly unique among constitutional rights, most of which apply in some
form even to those currently incarcerated.85 The one other right that is
frequently stripped from convicted felons—the right to vote—rests on
specific constitutional text that authorizes its denial to felons.86 By
reading such a textual hook for the wholesale denial of gun rights into
the penumbras of the Second Amendment, Justice Scalia can be seen
to have placed such denials on far more solid footing.87
B. Uncertainty Regarding the Scope of the Second Amendment
Is Disappointing Whether One Is Pro-Gun Rights or Pro-Gun
Control
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, gun rights activists predicted
that those decisions would open the door to a radical shift in gun
policy throughout the country.88 Soon after Heller was decided, the
Executive Vice President of the NRA declared that “[t]his is the

82. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 423 F. App’x 336 (4th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685
(7th Cir. 2010).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
85. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974) (“When a prison
regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts
will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (allowing the right to vote to be denied “for
participation in rebellion, or other crime”); see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24 (1974) (interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize stripping convicted
felons of the right to vote).
87. Indeed, the denial of the right to vote, the other right frequently denied to
convicted felons, already has such a textual hook in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“[W]hen the right to vote . . . is
denied . . . or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced [proportionally] . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
88. See Anna Stolley Persky, Despite 2nd Amendment Cases, Firearms Codes
Are Moving Targets, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2010, 1:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/an_unsteady_finger_on_gun_control_laws_second_amendment_fire
arms/ (“Proponents hailed Heller and McDonald as setbacks for gun control
advocates. They predicted a shift in gun policy throughout the country. But so far it
hasn’t happened that way. While there have been challenges throughout the country
to local, state and federal gun laws, few have been successful.”).
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opening salvo in a step-by-step process of bringing relief to people all
over this country who have been deprived of access to Second
Amendment freedom.”89 The NRA trumpeted that “Justice Scalia’s
64-page Second Amendment opinion was remarkably clear and
answered key, fundamental questions,”90 but the post-Heller reality
has not been so clear-cut. The Brady Campaign,91 a staunch opponent
of the NRA, emphasized in 2011 that “three years, 400 legal
challenges, and ‘millions of dollars in [NRA] legal bills’ later, all the
gun lobby has had to show for its efforts is a growing body of case law
affirming the right of the people to have strong gun laws short of a
total handgun ban.”92
While gun control activists may have had the second laugh, the tide
may be turning. A number of cases in 2012 have invalidated gun
regulations.93 For example, in Woollard v. Sheridan, the United
States District Court in Maryland held that a state law that required
an applicant for a concealed carry permit to demonstrate “good and
substantial reason” for the issuance of the permit was
unconstitutional.94 The court first held that the Second Amendment
right enunciated in Heller was not limited to the home.95 Then,
applying intermediate scrutiny, the district court held that a “citizen
may not be required to offer a ‘good and substantial reason’ why he
should be permitted to exercise his rights.”96 At the same time, the
Woollard court, and others, have been cautious to rule narrowly:

89. Wayne LaPierre, Standing Guard: An Individual Right Affirmed, NRA-ILA
(July
31,
2008),
http://nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2008/standing-guard-anindividual-right-aff.aspx.
90. Id.
91. BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, HOLLOW VICTORY? GUN LAWS
SURVIVE THREE YEARS AFTER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER, YET CRIMINALS
AND THE GUN LOBBY CONTINUE THEIR LEGAL ASSAULT, at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/Hollow_Victory.pdf.
92. Dennis Henigan, How Many Second Amendment Cases Will the NRA Lose?,
BRADY CAMPAIGN BLOG (Oct. 6, 2011), http://blog.bradycampaign.org/
?p=3515&s=1.
93. See, e.g., Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F.Supp.2d 462 (D. Md. 2012) (invalidating
Maryland concealed carry permitting system); Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v.
Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC, 271 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2012) (en banc)
(holding that state concealed handgun permitting system preempted ability of Board
of Regents to regulate handgun possession on campus; however, limiting its holding
to avoid the state constitutional issue).
94. See Woollard, 2012 WL 695674, at *1.
95. Id. at *7.
96. Id. at *12.
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The Court wishes to emphasize the limits of this decision. While it
finds Maryland’s requirement that a permit applicant demonstrate
“good and substantial reason” to be unconstitutional, the Court does
not address any of the State’s other regulations relating to the
possession and use of firearms, many of which would qualify as
presumptively lawful. Nor does the Court speculate as to whether a
law that required a “good and substantial reason” only of lawabiding citizens who wish to carry a concealed handgun would be
constitutional. Finally, the Court does not speak to Maryland’s
ability to declare that a specific applicant is unfit for a permit
because of some particular aspect of the applicant’s character or
history.97

This limiting language, common in the cases, flows directly from
the dicta in Heller, which suggested that some types of regulations
may in fact be “presumptively” reasonable and comport with the
Second Amendment.98 These perhaps purposeful attempts to limit
what became a groundswell of litigation after Heller have another,
more practical, implication: the cost for states and local governments
to defend against challenges to often long-standing gun regulations.
For example, in January of 2012, Heller himself was awarded more
than $1.1 million in attorneys’ fees and expenses.99 Indeed, this was a
concern of states and presumably cities prior to the Heller and
McDonald decisions.100
The uncertainty in the wake of Heller and McDonald has been
problematic for all involved. Advocates for the expansion of gun
rights won a major victory that has not translated into consistent and
significant results in the lower courts.101 Proponents of gun control
97. Id. at *12 (footnote omitted).
98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 n.26 (2008).
99. See Ryan Abbott, Defending Unconstitutional D.C. Gun Ban Will Cost
$1.1M, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.courthousenews.com/
2012/01/05/42799.htm (“Heller wanted $3.1 million in fees and costs, while D.C.
wanted to pay $840,000, ‘arguing that plaintiff’s counsel should not be permitted to
‘enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers,’ particularly during this time of
‘financial crisis.’”); see also John Chase, Mark Kirck Supports Court’s Overturning of
Gun Ban, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-0809/news/ct-met-mark-kirk-guns-20100809_1_gun-ban-gun-control-mark-kirk
(“I
think the critical thing to do here is to make sure that we don’t end up in endless,
expensive litigation.”).
100. See Malcolm Maclachlan, Gun Rights Groups Could Challenge State Laws
After Supreme Court 2nd Amendment Ruling, CAPITOL WKLY., Feb. 7, 2008,
http://www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=wvvzra5xciovjk
(“[D]efining
the
Second Amendment as an individual right would lead to years of expensive litigation,
just to defend gun laws already in existence.”).
101. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
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were left with a far tougher legislative and constitutional landscape in
which they must defend old laws while crafting new ones. The federal
government—and state and local governments in the post-McDonald
era—have been faced with a tide of expensive litigation over their
gun regulations, some of which have been on the books for a great
many years, despite the Heller Court’s admonition that “longstanding” regulations may be presumptively reasonable. Finally, the
courts themselves have had to expend judicial resources in deciding
the waves of cases that poured out of the Heller floodgate—and
which, for the most part, come out the same way as pre-Heller
decisions, upholding the challenged regulations.
C.

Heller and McDonald Have Left Open Many More
Questions Than They Have Answered

1.

What Is the Proper Standard of Review for Gun Control Laws?

Although the majority of courts seem to be settling on
intermediate scrutiny for gun laws that affect guns outside the home,
and strict scrutiny for the purported fundamental right of self-defense
within the four walls of one’s home, it is unclear whether the Supreme
Court would uphold that dichotomy.102 The only thing that is clear
about the Heller decision and the applicable standard of scrutiny is
that “rational basis” is not the appropriate standard. Justice Scalia’s
opinion explained that rational basis was simply not an appropriate
standard for an “enumerated constitutional right[].”103 One of my copanelists at the Fordham Urban Law Journal Symposium that
prompted this Article, Nelson Lund, suggests that the federal courts
of appeals “have quickly and fairly uniformly coalesced around an
interpretation of Heller” that provides a framework for standard of
review.104 Lund summarizes the so-called “consensus” as follows: 1)
“longstanding” regulations are presumed not to infringe the Second
Amendment, 2) substantial restrictions of the “core right of self

102. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller
World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617 (2012) (discussing standards of review).
103. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); see id. at 628 n.27
(“Obviously, the same [rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the extent to
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of
speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to
keep and bear arms. . . . If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and
bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”).
104. Lund, supra note 102, at 1622–23.
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defense” are subject to strict scrutiny, and 3) regulations that do not
“severely restrict” this “core right of self defense” are subject only to
intermediate scrutiny.105
But perhaps even Lund’s formulation of the “core” protection of
the Second Amendment (and presumably any state constitutional
analogues) is too broad. It ignores the home/public distinction,
concealed/open carry issues, and what “arms” are captured within
such a “core right.” One arguably has a core right to self-defense
walking down the nighttime streets of New York City, as much as one
has a core right in the home. Yet, the supposed “core right” is pretty
clearly subject to greater restrictions outside the home.
Indeed, several cases uphold complete bans on carrying weapons in
specific places that are outside the home. In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc.
v. State of Georgia, for example, the Middle District of Georgia
upheld a statute that forbade the carrying of guns into places of
worship.106 And, taking the principle even further, in United States v.
Masciandaro, the Fourth Circuit held that the right to self-defense did
not necessarily authorize an individual to bring a loaded handgun into
a national park.107
Moreover, notwithstanding the District of Maryland’s opinion in
Woollard, courts have opined that “according Second Amendment
protection to the carrying of an unconcealed weapon outside the
home would certainly go further than Heller did.”108 Relying on that
principle, the Southern District of New York declined to strike down
New York’s stringent gun licensing regime.109 Relying on similar
grounds, the District of Massachusetts let Boston’s regime stand,
noting that the license the plaintiff sought was not one to which she
was entitled because it “ha[d] no impact on her ability to defend
hearth and home or to defend herself at home.”110 And even though
it has been called into question by the District of Maryland in
Woollard, the Maryland Court of Appeals expressly held that a law
restricting handgun possession “outside of one’s home, is outside the
scope of the Second Amendment.”111 In none of these cases did a

105. Id.
106. 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
107. 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
108. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 265 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (emphasis
added).
109. See id.
110. Hightower v. City of Boston, 822 F. Supp. 2d 38, 63 (D. Mass. 2011).
111. Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1169 (Md. 2011).
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court consider that the “core right” was simply the right of selfdefense, unqualified by other concerns.

2.

Which Laws, if Any, Limiting Gun Rights Are Constitutional?

The Heller Court appears to have announced, without deciding,
that it did not intend to upset a number of laws including felon-inpossession, concealed carry, and other similar laws. However, it did
not indicate whether those laws were constitutional or analyze why
they were constitutional, leading to serious questions about the basis
of their validity. Justice Scalia’s sprawling opinion took dozens of
dizzying pages to come to the (perhaps textually unwarranted)
conclusion that the Second Amendment right was an individual right
entirely divorced from the first clause of the amendment. In contrast,
a short fifty-two-word passage and an eighteen-word footnote proved
to be perhaps the most important part of the opinion in terms of its
impact on decisions by plaintiffs to litigate and the lower courts’
resolution of those claims:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.112
....
We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as
examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.113

These simple words, which may have been an attempt to keep
closed the floodgates on Second Amendment litigation that would
inevitably open after Heller was decided (or perhaps because some
on the Supreme Court actually believed that these laws were
consistent with the Second Amendment), are at the heart of much of
today’s litigation over the right to bear arms.
If the passage was meant to prevent litigants from challenging this
laundry list of gun laws, it failed. Nearly everything in this list other
than the suggestion of the cessation of gun-rights for felons and

112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
113. Id. at 627 n.26.
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mentally ill has been challenged114—and, even there, it appears that
the “felons” category has had significant attacks post-Heller.115
At the same time, gun rights advocates often target common state
laws that permit individuals to carry concealed guns. The primary
distinction among those states with such permitting systems is
whether the system is a “shall issue” or a “may issue” system (or a
system without a permitting requirement such as Alaska, or the lone
outlier simply forbidding concealed carry, Illinois).116 Under the
“shall issue” system, the permitting authority must issue the permit if

114. See Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v. Students for Concealed Carry on
Campus, 271 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) (challenging ban on weapons on
University of Colorado campus); Complaint at 3–4, Lane v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv00503 (D. Va. May 10, 2011) (challenging Virginia and federal bans on sales to nonresident on behalf of D.C. resident who alleged there were no retail gun stores within
the District of Columbia); see also Alia Beard Rau, Arizona Senate Oks Bill on Guns
in Public Buildings, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 2012, http://www.azcentral.com/
arizonarepublic/local/articles/2012/04/12/20120412ariz-senate-oks-bill-guns-publicbuildings.html (“The Arizona Legislature has given final approval to a bill that could
allow guns on public property, including city halls, police stations, county courts,
senior centers, swimming pools, libraries and the state Capitol. . . . ‘I am a true
believer in the statement that an armed citizenry is a safe citizenry,’ [State Senator
Al] Melvin [R-Tucson] said. ‘Our founders, when they gave us the Second
Amendment, knew what they were doing. With this type of legislation, we have a
safer society.’”).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (felon in
possession of and selling firearms including a handgun with an obliterated serial
number challenged conviction on Second Amendment grounds); United States v.
Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (challenging felon in possession law); Britt v.
State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009) (holding statute prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms was unconstitutional as applied to individual convicted of felony drug
possession); State v. R.P.H., 265 P.3d 890 (Wash. 2011) (holding that termination of a
former juvenile sex offender’s obligation to register as such for a first degree rape
was a procedure equivalent to a “certificate of rehabilitation,” thus restoring his right
to possess a firearm).
116. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203 (2012) (“shall issue” concealed carry
permitting system), and Arnold Wyrick, Illinois the Final Holdout on Concealed
Carry, KFVS12 (May 16, 2012), http://www.kfvs12.com/story/18445132/illinois-thefinal-holdout-on-concealed-carry (“The Land of Lincoln is the only state in the nation
where a person can not legally carry a concealed weapon.”), with CAL. PENAL CODE §
26150 (West 2012) (“may issue” concealed carry permitting system), and Alaska
Concealed Handgun, ALASKA DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, http://www.dps.state.ak.us/
statewide/permitslicensing/concealedhandguns.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(“Alaska’s laws do not prohibit anyone 21 or older who may legally possess a firearm
from carrying it concealed. A special permit is not required.”). Alaska does issue
concealed carry permits, however, under a “shall-issue” system to those who request
them for the purpose of reciprocal permit acceptance in other states. See ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 18.65.700 (2012).
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the applicant meets the enumerated statutory qualifications.117 Under
the “may issue” system, the permitting authority, usually a sheriff’s
office, has much more discretion; these statutes typically include
enumerated requirements (albeit fewer than in a shall issue
jurisdiction) but imbue the decision-maker some discretion to refuse
for “good cause” or if the applicant cannot prove that they have a
“good” reason for the permit.118
Some states’ concealed carry laws have been challenged and
upheld post-Heller. In California for example, the “may issue”
concealed carry law has been challenged post-Heller and upheld
under intermediate scrutiny review, although a Southern District of
California court has stated that the concealed carry law undoubtedly
burdens the Second Amendment Right.119 Pursuant to the permitting
law, each county sheriff publishes a policy that implements the
permitting system and defines “good cause.”120 It has been explained
that the sheriff has “extremely broad discretion” in this
implementation.121

117. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1) (2012) (“[A] sheriff shall issue a
permit to carry a concealed handgun to an applicant who: (a) Is a legal resident of the
state of Colorado. . . . (b) Is twenty-one years of age or older; (c) Is not ineligible to
possess a firearm pursuant to section 18-12-108 or federal law; (d) Has not been
convicted of perjury . . . (e) . . . Does not chronically and habitually use alcoholic
beverages to the extent that the applicant’s normal faculties are impaired. . . . (f) Is
not an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance. . . . (g) Is not subject to:
. . . [various enumerated] protection order[s] . . . (h) Demonstrates competence with a
handgun by submitting [evidence of experience, law enforcement or military
background, handgun training certificate].”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(2) (2012)
(“Regardless of whether an applicant meets the criteria specified in subsection (1) of
this section, if the sheriff has a reasonable belief that documented previous behavior
by the applicant makes it likely the applicant will present a danger to self or others if
the applicant receives a permit to carry a concealed handgun, the sheriff may deny
the permit.”).
118. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150 (West 2012) (“When a person applies for
a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon
the person, the sheriff of a county may issue a license to that person upon proof of all
of the following: (1) The applicant is of good moral character. (2) Good cause exists
for issuance of the license. (3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a city
within the county, or the applicant’s principal place of employment or business is in
the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends a substantial period of
time in that place of employment or business. (4) The applicant has completed a
course of training as described in Section 26165.”).
119. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1114-15 (S.D. Cal.
2010).
120. See Gifford v. City of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164, 168 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 2012) (repealed 2012).
121. See Gifford, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167.
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In Peruta v. County of San Diego, however, the petitioner
challenged one sheriff’s regulation, which stated that “good cause”
was “a set of circumstances that distinguishes the applicant from
other members of the general public and causes him or her to be
placed in harm’s way.”122 The regulations further noted that
“[g]eneralized fear for one’s personal safety is not, standing alone,
considered ‘good cause.’”123 Notably, the Peruta court upheld the law
and the regulation against a Second Amendment challenge.124
Richards v. County of Yolo, another California federal case, similarly
held that there were “reasonable alternative means” to obtain and
keep a firearm “sufficient for self-defense purposes” without
construing the Second Amendment to “create a fundamental right to
carry a concealed weapon in public.”125 Furthermore, because of state
preemption, local ordinances or policies may not completely frustrate
the carry permitting law and system.126
Colorado’s “shall issue” concealed carry permitting law also has
been challenged post-Heller.127 In Peterson v. LaCabe, the plaintiff
challenged the residency requirement of the shall issue law, and the
court found that intermediate scrutiny applied and assumed without
deciding that the statute fell within the scope of the Second
Amendment.128 Regarding the Privileges and Immunities inquiry, the
district court similarly found that the statute met intermediate
scrutiny.129 Other challenges surrounded whether the sheriff denied
the plaintiff’s due process rights when the sheriff did not properly
explain why he was denying a permit130 and whether a set-aside
122. Peruta, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1114.
125. Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d, 1169, 1174–75 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
126. See Fiscal v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 335 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008).
127. See Peterson v. LaCabe, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2011) (holding that
the concealed weapons permit statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as
applied to an out-of-state resident, nor did it violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause or the Second Amendment).
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1176–78 (“I conclude that the state’s interest in monitoring a
potential licensee’s eligibility for a concealed handgun permit, and the increased
difficulty of doing so for out-of-state residents, also overcomes Plaintiff’s Second
Amendment challenge.”).
130. See Copley v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 431, 437 (Colo. App. 2009) (“Accordingly,
we conclude that the proceedings before the Sheriff deprived Copley of his basic
procedural due process rights under the United States and Colorado Constitutions
and under the concealed handgun statutes. In that regard, we note that our resolution
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conviction under another state’s laws would be interpreted as
‘unconvicted’ for purposes of the carry permit.131
On the other hand, the United States District Court in Maryland
recently held in Woollard v. Sheridan that a state law that required an
applicant for a concealed carry permit to demonstrate “good and
substantial reason” for the issuance of the permit was
unconstitutional.132 The court first held that the Second Amendment
right enunciated in Heller was not limited to the home.133 Then,
applying intermediate scrutiny, the district court held that a “citizen
may not be required to offer a ‘good and substantial reason’ why he
should be permitted to exercise his rights.”134 Moreover, on March 5,
2012, the Colorado Supreme Court in Regents of the University of
Colorado v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus held that the
state’s concealed carry permitting laws preempted the Regents’
attempt to ban handguns on the university campus.135 In short, the
legislature had carved out several places where people could not carry
their handguns, even if they had a permit, and public universities
were not among them (but public high schools and elementary
schools were).136 Thus, the Regents could not—in light of the
comprehensive nature of the legislature’s system—also regulate in the
area.137

of this case in no way relies on any substantive right to bear arms under either the
United States or Colorado Constitutions. Accordingly, because our concern here is
with errors of procedural due process committed by the Sheriff, we also conclude the
appropriate remedy is a remand to the Sheriff for a new hearing and reconsideration
of Copley’s request for reissuance of his permit.”).
131. See Seguna v. Maketa, 181 P.3d 399, 403 (Colo. App. 2008) (“We therefore
conclude that, for purposes of section 18-12-108(1), Seguna was not convicted of a
felony ‘under . . . any other state’s law.’ This conclusion leads directly to two more
conclusions: (1) under section 18-12-207(3), the Sheriff’s Office did not establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Seguna was ineligible to possess a firearm; and
(2) the district court erred when it concluded that the Sheriff’s Office properly
declined to renew Seguna’s concealed weapons permit under section 18-12-203(1)(c)
because he had been convicted of a felony in Michigan. . . . Because the set-aside
Michigan conviction formed the only basis for denying Seguna’s request to renew his
concealed handgun permit, the case is remanded to the district court with directions
to enter an order directing the Sheriff’s Office to renew Seguna’s permit.”).
132. See Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 475 (D. Md. 2012).
133. Id. at 469–70.
134. Id. at 475.
135. See Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v. Students for Concealed Carry on
Campus, 271 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2012) (en banc).
136. Id. at 500–01.
137. See id. at 500.
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It is clear that this short passage did not dissuade the staunchest of
gun rights advocates to use Heller as a license to challenge any gun
regulation.
II. CAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS O FFER BETTER CLARITY ABOUT
GUN RIGHTS?
In his seminal 1977 Harvard Law Review article, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, Justice William Brennan
persuasively argued that, although the Supreme Court had slowed
down significantly in its recognition and broadening of federal civil
rights, “state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too,
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending
beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal law.”138 Justice Brennan noted that recent state court opinions
that had expanded individual rights based on the texts of state
constitutions resulted from the fact “that these state courts discern, and
disagree with, a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme
Court to pull back from, or at least suspend from the time being, the
enforcement” of expansive federal constitutional rights.139
Justice Brennan noted that even where state constitutions
recognize a substantially different right from that which the United
States Constitution recognizes, “the system of federalism envisaged
by the United States Constitution tolerates such divergence where the
result is greater protection of individual rights under state law than
under federal law.”140 That is to say, although the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, necessarily
establishes a floor below which no state may fall when guaranteeing
individual rights, it by no means should be construed as setting a
ceiling on those individual rights.141 This recognition of the power of

138. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
139. Id. at 495.
140. Id. at 500 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6
(Haw. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. See, e.g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (noting the “authority [of
the State] to exercise its police power or it[s] sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution”); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] state is free as a
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.”); Cooper v.
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state constitutions came to be known as the New Judicial
Federalism.142
As noted above, the key holding in Heller was that the right to
bear arms that the United States Constitution guarantees is an
individual—as opposed to a collective—right.143
A necessary
corollary to this observation is that state constitutions can, pursuant
to New Judicial Federalism, confer broader individual gun rights than
the United States Constitution.
Before getting too excited about the prospect of unfettered broad
access to aircraft carriers and Pershing cruise missiles, one must
account for the slight matter of the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which, of course, would act as a limit on a state’s
ability to offer the broadest possible gun right protections through its
constitution. As Richard Fallon and his colleagues have noted, “the
state courts are obliged under the Supremacy Clause to disregard state
law if it conflicts with federal law, and that failure to do so is subject to
review in the Supreme Court.”144 The Supremacy Clause provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.145

Of its own terms, then, the Supremacy Clause allows federal law
and the U.S. Constitution to preempt not only state statutes, but state
constitutions as well. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized this
fact, not only noting that “[t]he nullity of any act . . . inconsistent with
the [federal] constitution is produced by the declaration, that the
constitution is the supreme law,”146 but also striking down state

California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (noting that states have the “power to impose
higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal
Constitution”).
142. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, The Silver Anniversary of New Judicial Federalism,
68 ALB. L. REV. 797 (2003).
143. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635 (2008).
144. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 957 (6th ed. 2009).
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
146. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210–11 (1824).
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constitutional provisions that conflict with federal laws, the U.S.
Constitution, or the pronouncements of federal judges.147
Professor Stephen McAllister puts it well: “even if states were to
recognize broader individual rights to possess and use firearms, such
recognition may be rendered ineffective by the preemptive operation
of federal statutory and regulatory law.”148 McAllister points out that
even if a state were to amend its constitution, the amendment may
lack any meaning in the face of federal constitutional and/or statutory
preemption.149 But McAllister may be overestimating the zeal with
which Congress would attempt to enact gun control laws to limit the
scope of state constitutional protections—the gun lobby, as we all
know, is very active in trying to remove politicians who enact progun-control laws.150 That minor inconvenience, along with the current
legislative paralysis in Washington, makes it less likely that a new
federal law would preempt specific, broader rights written into a state
constitution.
A. State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
States actually vary quite significantly in the extent to which their
constitutions confer the right to bear arms. Some of the state
constitutional provisions are identical (or nearly identical) to the
Second Amendment; interestingly, these seem to include some of the
first states, and the most recent states to enter the Union.151 Others

147. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that an amendment
to the Arkansas constitution preventing the desegregation of schools was of no effect
because Brown v. Board of Education was the supreme law of the land).
148. Stephen R. McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual
Sovereignty: The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 886 (2011).
149. See id. at 868–71.
150. See, e.g., NRA Lobbyists Hold Strong Influence Over Policy Agenda, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/30/nra-lobbyistshold-strong-influence-policy-agenda/.
151. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19 (“A well-regulated militia being
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed. The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied
or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.”); HAW. CONST. art. 1,
§ 17 (“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30
(“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies in
time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military
shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing
herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the
General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice.”) (emphasis
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go quite a bit further. For example, Connecticut’s constitution
specifically conferred an individual right to bear arms (by contrast, of
course, it took the Heller decision to determine that the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms was an individual right).152 The
Connecticut constitution provides, “[e]very citizen has a right to bear
arms in defense of himself and the state.”153 Kansas amended its
constitution in 2010 to incorporate the individual view of the right
and delineate the purposes for which the right was secured: “A
person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self,
family, home and state, for lawful hunting and recreational use, and
for any other lawful purpose . . . .”154 On the other hand, six state
constitutions do not contain any reference to a right to bear arms, and
citizens of those states currently can only rely on statutory and federal
constitutional law.155
Perhaps most importantly, a number of state constitutions go so far
as to limit the right explicitly, delegating authority to the legislature to
enact laws covering concealed carry or the manner in which the arms
may be borne. Eight states—Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, and New Mexico—expressly allow
the legislature to regulate the concealed carrying of arms.156 An
added); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“A well regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.”).
152. See CONN CONST. art. I, § 15.
153. CONN CONST. art. I, § 15; see also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“That every citizen
has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6
(“Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the
state.”).
154. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4; see also DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“A person
has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and State,
and for hunting and recreational use.”).
155. The states without rights to bear arms enshrined in their state constitutions
are: California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York. Citizens of
these states must rely on the federal Constitution and statutory regulation of arms.
See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 2012) (“A well regulated militia
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms cannot be infringed.”).
156. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“The right of no person to keep and bear arms
in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto
legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be
construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons.” (emphasis added));
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which
right shall not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to
govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person . . . .”); KY. CONST. § 1 (“The
right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of
the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed
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additional five states—Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and
Texas—carve out a more general swath of permissible legislative
regulation on how arms are “borne” or carried.157
There are a number of state constitutions with built-in limitations
on the right to keep and bear arms (some of which ultimately may be
found to be unconstitutional if they provide for less expansive
individual rights that a theoretical future Supreme Court
interpretation of the Second Amendment), but could states amend
their constitutions either to remove existing limitations, or
dramatically to expand gun rights? Although amending the federal
Constitution currently may be next to impossible as a practical and
political matter, amending state constitutions may not present the
same roadblocks, depending on the state.158 This leads to another
thought experiment.
weapons.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms
shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to
prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person.”); MISS. CONST. art. III, §
12 (“The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person,
or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be
called in question, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed
weapons.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“That the right of every citizen to keep and bear
arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid
of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of
concealed weapons.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The right of any person to keep
and bear arms in defense of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in question, but nothing
herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.”); N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 6 (“No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear
arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other
lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed
weapons.”).
157. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a) (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms
in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be
infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.”); GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 8 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in
which arms may be borne.”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The right of a citizen to
keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil
power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing
herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of
weapons.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“That the citizens of this State have a right to
keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime.”); TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the
lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to
regulate the wearing of arms, with the view to prevent crime.”).
158. See John Joseph Wallis, NBER/U. MARYLAND ST. CONST. PROJECT,
http://www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“There have been
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What Would a Particularly Pro-Gun Rights State
Constitutional Provision Look Like?

The logical place to start seems to be captured in statements by the
NRA’s Institute for Legislative Action (NRA-ILA), the lobbying arm
of the NRA.159 The NRA-ILA relies not only on the importance to
the framers that “the whole body of people always possess arms,”160
but also suggests that many gun control measures, such as licensing,
assault weapons bans, and even safety-training requirements, are of
little real value in comparison to the degree to which they infringe on
the right—and the ability—of law-abiding citizens to possess arms.161
It follows, at least according to the NRA-ILA, that the state
constitutional measure most likely to preserve the right to bear arms
to its maximum extent is one that prevents any of the myriad
infringements and limitations on that right that have been constructed
over the last two centuries. Such a proposal might look something
like this:
The State may not infringe on the individual right of any resident of
the State, and all persons present therein, to keep and bear arms and
weapons of any kind whatsoever for the security and defense of the
person and property of one’s self or of others, the common defense,
hunting, recreation, or any otherwise-lawful purpose. No criminal
penalty may work an infringement of the right to bear arms, and any
person imprisoned shall have his full right to bear arms restored
immediately upon release. The State may provide penalties for

almost 150 state constitutions, they have been amended roughly 12,000 times, and the
text of the constitutions and their amendments comprises about 15,000 pages of
text.”); Edward L. Lascher, Jr. et al., Opinion, It’s Too Easy to Amend California’s
Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oehodson4-2009feb04,0,2927280.story (“[T]he nation’s founders didn’t make it easy to
change the U.S. Constitution; they required amendments to gain approval by twothirds of the Congress and three-fourths of the states. . . . By comparison, California’s
initiative amendment process is simple.”); Rex W. Huppke, Lawsuits Filed in Cook
County Claiming State’s Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB., May
31,
2012,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-31/news/ct-met-same-sexmarriage-lawsuit-20120531_1_marriage-ban-marriage-equality-marriage-rights
(noting that North Carolina became the thirty-first state to amend its state
constitution to ban same-sex marriage; these thirty-one states amended their
constitutions over a period of less than fifteen years).
159. About NRA-ILA, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/about-nra-ila.aspx (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012).
160. The Second Amendment, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/secondamendment/the-second-amendment.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
161. See generally News & Issues, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/newsissues.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
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crimes committed by the unlawful use of arms, but may not provide
additional penalties on the basis that a crime is committed by means
of any arm. The State shall not in any way limit the right of any
person to own arms for any reason; nor shall any limitation be
placed on the right of any person not engaged in unlawful activity to
stand one’s ground and to use deadly force in defense of one’s self
or others if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to
prevent death or great bodily harm to any person or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony; nor shall any limitations be placed
on how arms may be carried in any public place or other property
subject to the jurisdiction of the state, or by the proprietor of any
public business. No municipality or county shall regulate, in any
way, an incident of the right to keep and bear arms, and to the
extent that the selling, manufacture, or use of arms occurs entirely
within the state, it shall not be subject to regulation by any other
authority.
What is immediately striking about this proposed amendment is its
length; to say the least, it lacks the pithiness of the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although brevity is
the soul of wit, over two centuries of debate over what is or is not
included in the “right to keep and bear arms” makes clear that there
is nothing to be gained by brevity in defining gun rights.
That said, although this proposed amendment is intended to
capture the broadest possible right to bear arms, it is fairly complete:
every clause addresses an actual issue that has arisen in the fight
between proponents of gun rights and gun control. And while the
people of a particular state might pick and choose among the many
options embedded in this proposed language when amending their
state constitution, the complete version appears to capture the full
breadth that can be given to the right to bear arms. To demonstrate
this, we will explain the background of each of the provisions above:
The State may not infringe on the individual right of any resident of
the State, and all persons present therein . . .
The first clause of this proposed amendment sets the tone by
eliminating some of the confusing grammatical structures of the
Second Amendment. This proposed amendment does not bury its
restrictions behind a prefatory clause, nor does it speak in the passive
voice; rather this is set up out front as a clear restriction on something
that the State may not do.
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Second, the clause clearly protects an “individual right.” Although
it would appear that Heller had already settled this question,162 it is
worth noting that the Supreme Court had previously denied that the
Second Amendment necessarily protected any such individual right163
and that even in Heller, this notion only carried a bare, 5-4 majority.164
Judge Wilkinson has pointed out that “the textual ambiguity in Heller
goes to the very existence of an individual right, not its scope; the case
involved the creation of a new substantive constitutional right that
had not been recognized in over two hundred years.”165 In the
absence of a clearer statement, it is entirely possible that a
reinterpretation of the Second Amendment may see fit to limit this
part of Heller’s holding. Moreover, the proposed language takes
inspiration from several states that have left no doubt about whom
the right to bear arms belongs to by expressly ascribing it to the
“individual.”166
Third, this first clause wholly disassociates the right to bear arms
from citizenship, proclaiming it to be a fundamental right of all
persons resident in or present in the state. This disassociation severs
the link between the right to bear arms and militia service that
undergirded the holding in Miller.167 This represents a significant
162. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems to us
no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.” (emphasis added)).
163. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (“[T]he Second
Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have ‘some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’”
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))).
164. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Surely [the Second
Amendment] protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything
about the scope of that right.”).
165. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
VA. L. REV. 253, 272–73 (2009).
166. See ARIZ CONST. art. II, § 26 ; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art I, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24. Many other states use language of
similar import, referring to “each citizen” or “every citizen” or words of similar
import. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“every citizen”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15
(“every citizen”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“each citizen”); ME. CONST. art. I, § 16
(“every citizen”); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“Every person”); MISS. CONST. art. III, §
12 (“every citizen”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“every citizen”); MONT. CONST. art II, §
12 (“any person”); NEV. CONST. art I, § 11, ¶ 1 (“every citizen”); TEX. CONST. art I, §
23 (“every citizen”); W. VA. CONST. art III, § 22 (“a person”).
167. Cf. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“With obvious purpose
to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces [i.e.
the Militia] the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”).
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expansion on many states’ constitutional provisions, which expressly
limit the scope of their right to bear arms to citizens only.168 At the
same time, it squares neatly with (and may even expand) Heller,
which noted that the Second Amendment codifies a “right of the
people,” and therefore applies not only to citizens, but to “a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be part of that
community.”169 By expressly protecting non-citizens, this proposal
acknowledges that “[t]he right to bear arms is in part aimed at selfdefense, something valuable to all people and not just to citizens.”170
Finally, the first clause of the proposal expands the reach of the
right to bear arms to “all persons present” in the state. This is
intended to expand upon the Second Amendment right; current case
law (though pre-dating Heller) permits states to bar possession of a
firearm by out-of-state residents.171 Not only is there a colorable
argument that (notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s holding to the
contrary in Bach v. Pataki172) such provisions may conflict with the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,173 but such
restrictions also deprive residents of the same ability to defend
themselves as is afforded to state residents.174
. . . to keep and bear arms and weapons of any kind whatsoever . . .
As described above in Scope III and IV in the first part of this
Article, the Heller majority attempted to distinguish between various
classes of weapons, although it is far from clear whether such dicta
makes for good law when it comes to the “arms and weapons” the

168. See sources cited supra note 166.
169. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). But see Heller, 554 U.S. at 580–81 (noting
that “the people” is a broader category than the militia, and that therefore the use of the
phrase “the people” supported a finding of a right to bear arms unconnected with militia
service). To the extent that the use of the phrase “the people” disconnected the Second
Amendment right from militia service, expanding the class of persons covered must, a
fortiori, suggest such separation at least as strongly.
170. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,
1514 (2009).
171. See Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 95 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding New York’s
denial of gun licenses to non-residents under the Second Amendment and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses).
172. Id.
173. See Nelson Lund, Have Gun, Can’t Travel: The Right to Arms Under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 73 UMKC L. REV. 951 (2005).
174. See id. at 962.
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State may not restrict or prohibit.175 Justice Scalia put particular
emphasis on the “popularity” of handguns as an “arm” useful for selfdefense in the home in overturning the D.C. law at issue in Heller,176
even as the Court attempted to limit the Second Amendment right to
prevent individuals from carrying “dangerous and unusual weapons”
of a type “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns” and “M-16 rifles and the
like.”177 More important, Scope IV points out that the challenge in
Heller, and the decision therein, in fact may be further limited to the
type of handgun at issue in that challenge: a .22 caliber revolver and
similar small bore handguns.
This phrase of the proposed amendment, therefore, eliminates the
uncertainty surrounding Justice Scalia’s homage to the popularity of
small arms and the dicta disapproving those substantially larger arms.
Not only does the expansion of the right to “arms and weapons of any
kind whatsoever” comport with the historical record—where various
cannons, howitzers and other “weapons of mass destruction” of the
18th and early 19th century were classified as “arms” and held by
private parties for use in the militias,178 but also grants citizens the
freedom to possess and use any firearm of their choice.
Of course, existing federal firearms law, operating through the
Supremacy Clause, will necessarily limit this phrase in the proposed
amendment—”any kind whatsoever” will come with the caveat
causing the phrase to read thus, “of any kind not presently prohibited
by federal law.” Nonetheless, considering the (relatively) narrow
prohibitions of federal firearms laws, the proposed amendment
provides broad availability of numerous arms and weapons which
would otherwise be banned under existing state laws and which are
not restricted by federal law.179 The sunsetting of the Federal Assault

175. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619–26 (2008).
176. The Court put significant stock into the fact that, “[w]hatever the reason,
handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the
home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
177. Id. at 625–27.
178. See sources cited supra note 71.
179. For example, California bans an extensive list of weapons and ammunition
including: cane guns, wallet guns, undetectable firearms or firearms not immediately
recognizable as a firearm, any ammunition which contains or consists of any fléchette
dart, any bullet containing or carrying an explosive agent, ballistic knives, nunchaku,
short-barreled shotguns or rifles, metal, wood, or hard plastic composite knuckles,
belt buckle knives, leaded canes, zip guns, shuriken, lipstick case knives, cane swords,
shobi-zue, writing pen knives, and weapons colloquially known as a blackjack,
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Weapons Ban in 2004180 and Congress’s failure to pass similar
legislation in the past decade181 open the door to virtually any legally
procurable weapons including a broad variety of military-style
weapons such as semi-automatic AK-47s, Uzi carbines, TEC-DC9s (a
semi-automatic pistol with a thirty-two round magazine), and any
number of other semi-automatic weapons with high-capacity
magazines, to name just a few.182
. . . for the security and defense of the person and property of one’s
self or of others, the common defense, hunting, recreation, or any
otherwise-lawful purpose.
The purpose undergirding the right to bear arms has been at the
foundation of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment
jurisprudence. The Miller Court upheld a ban on short-barreled
shotguns entirely on the basis that it lacked “some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia.”183 Conversely, Heller and McDonald invalidated handgun
restrictions primarily because the Court held that the Second
Amendment protects a right to self-defense in the home, for which
handgun possession was necessary.184
At the same time, the perceived purpose of the Second
Amendment has been used to narrow its scope considerably. Justice
Scalia freely acknowledged that the Heller opinion dissociates the

slungshot, billy, sandclub, sap, or sandbag. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16000–24790
(West 2012).
180. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, §§ 110101–06, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
181. All attempts to reinstate the assault weapons ban since the sunsetting of the
original ban have failed. See Assault Weapons Ban Reauthorization Act of 2008,
H.R. 6257, 110th Cong. (2008); Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement
Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 1022, 110th Cong. (2007); Assault Weapons Ban and
Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1312, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 5099,
108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 3831, 108th Cong. (2004); Assault Weapons Ban and Law
Enforcement Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2038, 108th Cong. (2003).
182. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 110102, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
183. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
184. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (“[H]andguns are
the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a
complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”); see also McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Second Amendment was
incorporated against the states because “[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by
many legal systems from ancient times to the present day”).
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right to bear arms from militia service,185 which flies in the face of the
Framing-era view that the right to arms was essential to the
protection of the populace from foreign invasion or insurrection—
core justifications for militias rather than individuals. The Gun
Control Act of 1968 provides privileged treatment specifically to
sporting weapons, carving out an exception in import prohibitions.186
At least one scholar has argued that it is unlikely that the Second
Amendment was drafted with personal self-defense in mind.187
Indeed, once the right to bear arms is given a single “core”
purpose, then the scope of that right may become similarly limited.
Emphasizing the importance of military weapons diminishes the
significance of self-defense, emphasizing self-defense decreases the
need for assault rifles, and so forth. The most expansive possible
state amendment, however, would necessarily define the right as nonexclusively as possible. The text above draws its inspiration from the
full panoply of state constitutional provisions, the vast majority of
which clearly protect the right to defend one’s self or others,188 and, in
some cases, expressly grant the right to defend property.189 As in
several other states, this amendment would also proclaim hunting,
recreation, and other uses of firearms to be fundamental rights.190

185. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28 (“But the fact that modern developments have
limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot
change our interpretation of that right.”).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 925 (2006) (permitting the importation of weapons “generally
recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable for sporting purposes”).
187. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 110 (2000) (“Theirs was a rhetoric of public
liberty, not public health; of the danger from standing armies, not that of casual
strangers, embittered family members, violent youth gangs, freeway snipers, and
careless weapons keepers.”).
188. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK. CONST. art. II, §
5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4; KY. CONST.
art. I, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H.
CONST. part I, art. II; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT.
CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 24; WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 25; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.
189. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, §
23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26.
190. Cf. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11;
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25.
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Finally, this proposal would maximize liberty while diminishing any
limitations on liberty. The amendment would expressly codify a right
to bear arms in the “common defense”—a term that may codify the
view that “when the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms
and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.”191 At the same
time, this does not pair the freedom to bear arms with the
responsibility to do so in defense of the state, as would be required by
several states that provide a right to bear arms “in aid of the civil
power when thereto legally summoned,”192 which seems to expressly
codify a power on behalf of the states to enlist their armed populace
into service. This proposal does not, however, go so far as to bar any
of the militia-regulating measures that often required service by all
residents of a state.193 It could be argued that, to truly codify the
maximum scope of a right to bear arms, the government would
necessarily be debarred from requiring any service whatsoever as an
incident of that right.
No criminal penalty may work an infringement of the right to bear
arms, and any person imprisoned shall have his full right to bear
arms restored immediately upon release.
This passage addresses one group for which the right to bear arms
is curtailed nationally: convicted criminals. Although this denial of
gun rights is textually dubious under the Second Amendment (which,
unlike the voting provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
expressly exempt convicted criminals from its ambit),194 it has also
been repeatedly upheld as a reasonable restriction on gun rights by
myriad courts.195
The effect of this restriction is to allow a single indiscretion—albeit
often a regrettable and violent one—to curtail wholly a fundamental
right to self-defense. It is clear how this leaves a convicted criminal
191. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008).
192. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; see also MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art.
I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
193. For a discussion of these laws, see, for example, Heller, 554 U.S. at 650–51
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (allowing for the right to vote to be
abridged for “participation in rebellion, or other crime”).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 423 F. App’x 336 (4th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685
(7th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010)
(upholding restrictions on gun possession by drug users); United States v. Yancey,
621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (upholding restrictions on gun ownership by those convicted of
domestic violence misdemeanors).
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unable to defend himself or herself against a would-be attacker or
even a domestic abuser. What is less well-known is the degree to
which this may expose a convicted felon—and his or her neighbors—
to frequent police searches.196 And in some places, such a draconian
deprivation of rights may even leave convicted criminals unable to
defend themselves against non-human assailants, such as Alaskan
bears and wolverines.197
Allowing for reinstatement of gun rights takes full advantage of a
1986 provision of the Firearm Owners Protection Act that allows for
a convicted felon to own a gun if he has had his civil rights restored.198
This is consistent with a general trend of states allowing for the
restoration of gun rights by all convicted felons in recognition of the
fact that past violent conduct is not necessarily a valid reason to
infringe upon fundamental gun rights.199
The state may provide penalties for crimes committed by the
unlawful use of arms, but may not provide additional penalties on
the basis that a crime is committed by means of any arm.
It is clear that violent crime deserves punishment—and that guns
can be used to kill or injure. The first portion of this provision makes
clear that the use of a gun or other weapon to commit an assault,
murder, or any other crime—violent or non-violent—may be
punished.
What this provision does do, however, is eliminate two kinds of
discrimination. The first is discrimination against gun owners. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that the exchange of a gun for
drugs—without the gun having ever been fired or even brandished—
is subject to a mandatory sentencing enhancement simply because of

196. See Al Baker & Joseph Goldstein, 2 Opinions on Stop-and-Frisk Report, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A27 (noting that the New York Police Department’s
controversial “stop-and-frisk” policy is part of “the department’s steadfast
commitment to going after illegal guns”).
197. See, e.g., The Essentials for Traveling in Bear Country, ALASKA DEP’T FISH &
GAME, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=livingwithbears.bearcountry (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012) (“A .300-Magnum or a 12-gauge shotgun with rifled slugs are
appropriate weapons if you have to shoot a bear. Heavy handguns such as a .44Magnum may be inadequate in emergency situations, especially in untrained
hands.”); see also 5 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 92.410 (2012) (allowing any person
to shoot an animal “in defense of life or property,” and providing specific provisions
for “a black bear, wolf, wolverine, or coyote” or a “brown bear”).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
199. See Michael Luo, Felons Finding it Easy To Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2011, at A1.
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the presence of a gun in the transaction.200 Justice O’Connor
reasoned in that case that using a gun “momentarily as an item of
commerce does not render it inert or deprive it of destructive
capacity. Rather, as experience demonstrates, it can be converted
instantaneously from currency to cannon.”201 This reasoning alone
shows a bias against those who choose to arm themselves.
There is a second type of discrimination that this provision also
prevents: punishing gun offenses more severely than otherwiseidentical crimes committed without a gun. For example, in New
York, assault in the third degree, inter alia, can consist of
intentionally causing physical injury to a person.202 That crime is
elevated to second-degree assault if the individual intends to cause
and causes “serious physical injury.”203 But, the only difference
between second- and first-degree assault is the use of a “deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument.”204 This does not punish the degree
of culpability or the harm caused, then, but merely tacks on penalties
for the mere use of a weapon, notwithstanding that having a weapon
is a fundamental right.
This provision is also one of a relative handful that may be
substantially implemented by the passage of this amendment, since it
will immediately alter the nature of the state’s criminal law, even if it
is unable to overcome federal laws like those at issue in Smith.205
The state shall not in any way limit the right of any person to own
arms for any reason . . .
The Heller majority also attempted to carve out restrictions on
the possession and use of arms by certain individuals—namely,
felons and the mentally ill—as “presumptively lawful.”206 As the
majority noted, “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill . . . .”207 Although a significant number of
the post-Heller cases have expressly upheld the possession ban by

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 231 (1993).
Id. at 240.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2012).
Id. § 120.05.
Id. § 120.10.
See Smith, 508 U.S. 223.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008).

Id. at 626.
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convicted felons,208 drug users,209 and those convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanors,210 successful challenges to these
“presumptively lawful” bans on classes of individuals have
occurred.211 Indeed, a number of states expressly permit ex-felons to
petition for the restoration of their right to bear arms by statute.212
Thus, rather than force any of the restricted classes of individuals—
which restrictions the Supreme Court has expressly denoted
“presumptively lawful”—to endure statutory and administrative
processes for the reinstatement of rights, this clause in the proposed
amendment gives states the ability to broadly expand the right to
keep and bear arms. Although objection may be lodged on account
of the extremely broad nature of this clause—granting rights to exfelons and the mentally ill for example—federal legislation already
prevents certain undesirable individuals from firearm possession.213
The states may therefore continue the commitment to a broad right to
bear arms, limiting any negative implications of the capacious
definition of the right in the state constitution by operation of federal
law via the Supremacy Clause.

208. See, e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 423 F. App’x 336 (4th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685
(7th Cir. 2010).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding
federal ban on firearm possession by individuals convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors, based on analysis of Heller and historical analysis of the history
behind felon and misdemeanor possession laws); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d
638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
211. See, e.g., Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009) (holding statute prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms was unconstitutional as applied to individual
convicted of felony drug possession); State v. R.P.H., 265 P.3d 890 (Wash. 2011)
(holding that termination of a former juvenile sex offender’s obligation to register as
such for a first degree rape was a procedure equivalent to a “certificate of
rehabilitation,” thus restoring his right to possess a firearm).
212. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.165 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.14
(West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.274 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-29-101 to 105 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (2012).
213. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell
or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that such person—(1) is under indictment for, or has
been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year; (2) is a fugitive from justice; (3) is an unlawful user of or
addicted to any controlled substance . . . (4) has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or has been committed to any mental institution; (5) who, being an alien . . .
is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; . . . (9) has been convicted in any court
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”).
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. . . nor shall any limitation be placed on the right of any person not
engaged in unlawful activity to stand one’s ground and to use deadly
force in defense of one’s self or others if he or she reasonably
believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily
harm to any person or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony; . . .
This provision is now well-known as the stand-your-ground
provision, lifted, with some modifications, directly from the Florida
Statutes.214 As the NRA-ILA observes, this is truly a codification of
the common law rule that imposes no “duty to retreat from criminal
attack”215 and recent polls have found that, notwithstanding the
Trayvon Martin shooting, such laws remain popular.216
Indeed, this provision would “endorse the idea of self-empowerment
and standing with victims of violent attacks.”217 As one commentator
points out, the right to self-defense carries with it the necessity that
“[c]itizens must be able to protect themselves without fear that selfdefense will be legally problematic.”218 And that, conversely, without
the unfettered right to shoot first and ask questions later, the law would
unduly favor those who wish to do harm to others by curtailing the
right of citizens to use deadly force on any suspicion that they might be
in danger.
Indeed, we have adopted a similar rule for police officers: “There is
no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person
suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and
take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.”219 There is even less
reason why a civilian—neither trained in self-defense nor charged

214. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2012).
215. “Stand Your Ground” Laws Attacked Despite Broad Public Support, NRAILA (May 11, 2012), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2012/standyour-ground-laws-attacked-despite-broad-public-support.aspx.
216. Marc Caputo, Poll: Majority of Florida’s Registered Voters Favor Stand Your
Ground Law, MIAMI HERALD, May 25, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/05/24/2815692/poll-majority-of-flordas-registered.html; Anthony Man, Stand
Your Ground Enjoys Strong Support, Opinion Poll Finds, SUN SENTINEL, May 10,
2012, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-05-10/news/fl-trayvon-stand-your-groundpoll-20120510_1_florida-voters-opinion-poll-independents-favor.
217. Caputo, supra note 216 (quoting State Rep. Dennis Baxley) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
218. Rich Mortland, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Protect the Innocent, U.S. NEWS:
DEBATE CLUB (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-stand-yourground-laws-a-good-idea/stand-your-ground-laws-protect-the-innocent.
219. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J. concurring).
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with protecting the safety of anyone but himself—should be held to a
higher standard.
. . . nor shall any limitations be placed on how arms may be carried
in any public place or other property subject to the jurisdiction of
the state, or by the proprietor of any public business.
The Supreme Court in Heller also all but stated that concealed
carry restrictions are permissible under the Second Amendment.220
Further, most states have some form of concealed carry permitting
laws.221 The primary distinction, among the vast majority that have a
permitting system, is whether the system is “no issue,” “shall issue,”
“may issue,” or without any requirement for a concealed carry
permit.222 Under the “shall issue” scheme, the permitting authority
must issue the permit if the applicant meets the enumerated statutory
qualifications.223 Under the “may issue” scheme, the permitting
authority, usually a sheriff or his or her office, has much more
discretion; these statutes typically include enumerated requirements
(albeit fewer than in a shall issue jurisdiction) but imbue the decisionmaker some discretion to refuse for “good cause” or if the applicant
cannot prove that they have a “good” reason for the permit.224
Some states’ concealed carry laws have been challenged and
upheld post-Heller.225 It appears then, in light of the Supreme Court’s
dicta in Heller and state court decisions post-Heller, that concealed
carry restrictions are likely to be upheld. Therefore, the inclusion of
this clause in the proposed amendment will constitutionally protect
the right to bear arms on one’s own property and public property
whether carrying openly or concealed. While private property
owners may restrict the ability for an individual to bring weapons or
arms upon their land, the proposed constitutional amendment will
ensure that a state government is not able to burden the right,
220. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[T]he right secured
by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19thcentury cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose. . . . For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to
consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were
lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”).
221. Right-to-Carry 2012, NRA-ILA (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.nraila.org/gunlaws/articles/2012/right-to-carry-2012.aspx.
222. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 119, 125 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 127–29,
131 and accompanying text.
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especially given that the Second Amendment seems not to protect the
right to carry (perhaps at all, outside the home).
No municipality or county shall regulate, in any way, an incident of
the right to keep and bear arms . . .
Even if a local government were able to enact a measure consistent
with the earlier clauses of the broad proposed amendment, this clause
clarifies and “constitutionalizes” the preemption of local legislation
surrounding the right to keep and bear arms. Indeed, many state
legislatures have enacted laws pre-empting local governments from
enacting more restrictive firearms regulations than those prescribed
by the state government.226 Recent news coverage has shown that
such a restriction vests a significant amount of power in the state
government over any local efforts—even time, place, and mannertype restrictions—on the carrying of firearms. For example, in
advance of the 2012 Republican National Convention in Tampa,
Florida, Tampa Mayor Bob Buckhorn sought executive approval
from Florida Governor Rick Scott to circumvent the recently enacted

226. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53071 (West 2012) (“It is the intention of the
Legislature to occupy the whole field of regulation of the registration or licensing of
commercially manufactured firearms as encompassed by the provisions of the Penal
Code, and such provisions shall be exclusive of all local regulations, relating to
registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms, by any political
subdivision as defined in Section 1721 of the Labor Code.”); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1812-201 to -216 (2012) (preempting local regulation of concealed carry of firearms);
FLA. STAT. § 790.33 (2012) (“[T]he Legislature hereby declares that it is occupying
the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition . . . [and] [a]ny such existing
[local] ordinances, rules, or regulations are hereby declared null and void.”); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-351(2) (2012) (“[A] county, city, town, consolidated local
government, or other local government unit may not prohibit, register, tax, license, or
regulate the purchase, sale or other transfer (including delay in purchase, sale, or
other transfer), ownership, possession, transportation, use, or unconcealed carrying
of any weapon, including a rifle, shotgun, handgun, or concealed handgun.”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-915 (2012) (“No locality shall adopt or enforce any ordinance,
resolution or motion, as permitted by § 15.2-1425, and no agent of such locality shall
take any administrative action, governing the purchase, possession, transfer,
ownership, carrying, storage or transporting of firearms, ammunition, or components
or combination thereof other than those expressly authorized by statute. . . . Any
local ordinance, resolution or motion adopted prior to the effective date of this act
governing the purchase, possession, transfer, ownership, carrying or transporting of
firearms, ammunition, or components or combination thereof, other than those
expressly authorized by statute, is invalid.”); Regents of the Univ. of Colo. v.
Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, 271 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2012) (en banc)
(holding that state concealed handgun permitting system preempted ability of Board
of Regents to regulate handgun possession on campus; however, limiting its holding
to avoid the state constitutional issue).
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state preemption statute.227
Governor Scott turned down the
request—limited to the few days surrounding the convention and to
the downtown area in which the convention will be held—citing the
Second Amendment as justification for the denial.228
Although Florida’s and other states’ statutory preemption
effectively limits the ability of local governments to regulate firearms
more strictly than any given state, the clause included in the proposed
amendment would put the right to keep and bear arms on more solid
constitutional ground (especially should the interpretation of the
federal Constitution’s Second Amendment change) and prevent local
governments from enacting laws that may not necessarily be explicitly
or impliedly preempted by statute.
. . . and to the extent that the selling, manufacture, or use of arms
occurs entirely within the State, it shall not be subject to regulation
by any other authority.
This provision draws its inspiration from the proliferation of
“Firearms Freedom Acts” around the United States. These laws seek
to free guns that are manufactured, sold, and used wholly in-state
from regulation under any federal laws.229 These provisions rely on
the fact that the Federal Firearms Act and the Gun Control Act rely
primarily on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution for the
assertion of federal jurisdiction.230
The status of these laws is currently unclear, however. In Montana
Shooting Sports Association v. Holder,231 the District of Montana
rejected the assertion that such a law could exempt local arms from
federal regulation, holding that “the fact that federal firearms laws
‘ensnare some purely intrastate activity,’ such as the manufacturing
and sales activity purportedly exempted from regulation by the Act,
‘is of no moment.’”232 However, the case has been appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, although it is currently stayed pending the outcome of

227. Florida’s Gov. Scott: No Gun Ban for Downtown Tampa During GOP
Convention, MSNBC (May 2, 2012), http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/
2012/05/02/11507172-floridas-gov-scott-no-gun-ban-for-downtown-tampa-during-gopconvention?lite.
228. See id.
229. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-102 (West 2009).
230. See Joseph Luppino-Esposito, Comment, Four Shots at the Commerce

Clause: The Firearms Freedom Act and the Unarticulated Products Category of the
Commerce Power, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 229, 242–44 (2010).
231. No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
232. Id. at *17 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)).
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Nordyke v. King.233 The outcome depends on the complex interplay
among Gonzales v. Raich,234 United States v. Lopez,235 Wickard v.
Filburn,236 and National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius.237 Accordingly, it is difficult to predict whether this
provision can effectively insulate intrastate guns from federal
jurisdiction.
C.

Potential Sources of Federal Law that Could Counteract
State Constitutional Provisions

The Supreme Court has long recognized the new judicial
federalism, that “a state is entirely free to read its own State’s
constitution more broadly than this Court reads the Federal
Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in
favor of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional
guarantee.”238 Thus, whether the provision of a state’s constitution is
broader than the federal Constitution on its face, or achieves that
result by the interpretation of that state’s courts, it is widely
recognized that the United States Constitution is the floor, and states
are free to embrace expansive rights not recognized in the federal
Constitution.239 Moreover, the Supreme Court has embraced a
laissez-faire approach in allowing the States to interpret their own
constitutions: “It is fundamental that state courts be left free and
unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.”240 Taking
this power to heart, states routinely grant broader rights, whether it is
with respect to search and seizure, police behavior, due process, or
even suspect classifications for gender discrimination.241

233. Order at 1, No. 10-36094 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2011).
234. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
235. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
236. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
237. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
238. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982).
239. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
240. Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
241. See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 202 (Cal. 1985) (applying
strict scrutiny for gender discrimination claims under the California constitution);
Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 814 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (“Our state due process constitutional analysis differs from that
conducted pursuant to the federal due process clause in that the claimant need not
establish a property or liberty interest as a prerequisite in invoking due process
protection . . . [it] is ‘much more inclusive’ and protects a broader range of interests.”
(citations omitted)).
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In the case of gun rights, however, there is a substantial field of
existing federal legislation that conflicts with the broad amendment
described above. It is clear that the Supremacy Clause would be a
limitation on any state constitutional amendment. But it is wellsettled that the federal government is supreme only when it acts within
its enumerated powers.242 It is currently unclear precisely how far the
federal government can go in regulating firearms. The Supreme Court
made it clear in United States v. Lopez that the federal government
cannot simply regulate intra-state activity, and, specifically, cannot ban
gun possession near schools under the enumerated powers of
Congress.243 Of course, the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated in
Lopez was re-enacted shortly thereafter, with the sole difference being
the requirement that the firearm in question “has moved in or that
otherwise affects interstate . . . commerce.”244
If, in fact, this type of jurisdictional hook is all that is required to give
Congress nearly plenary power to regulate gun use, then there are
effectively no constitutional limits on the powers of Congress. Indeed,
the vast majority of federal gun regulations already rely on similar
jurisdictional hooks: for example, the Federal Firearms Act regulates
dealers of guns that move in commerce.245 Under the logic of Gonzales
v. Raich,246 it is extremely easy for Congress to use broad regulation of
commerce to impose extremely restrictive regulations on firearms
possession.247
Thus, under the Commerce Power, Congress may indeed have the
power to legislate weapons right down to the floor set by the Supreme
Court with respect to the Second Amendment or any other
constitutional right. Yet, the question of whether they will move to
block a state’s attempt to ratchet up the right to bear arms via a state

242. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by Congress must be based
on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”).
243. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006).
245. See United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006).
246. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
247. Applying Raich, the District of Montana recently invalidated a state law that
purported to insulate intrastate firearms sales from federal regulation. See Mont.
Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029 (D.
Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). That case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, however,
and is currently stayed pending the outcome of Nordyke v. King, which was reargued
recently en banc. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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constitution is as speculative as suggesting how broadly a state might
try to go.248
It is also possible that Congress could try to limit state
constitutional provisions of the right to bear arms by exercising its
Taxing and Spending Powers, but that power is also subject to its own
limitations.249 However, as long as courts continue to recognize public
safety as a compelling interest validly served by gun regulation, it is
likely that any regulations of weapons, short of actual bans, would
have the required nexus to funding for Congress to impose
restrictions.
Additionally, gun regulations also potentially could be enacted as
“Necessary and Proper” to the exercise of legitimate federal power.
It is clear that the federal government may restrict gun possession on
federal land, for example.250 But they may also enact restrictions on
persons who come into federal jurisdiction by other routes, as well.
The felon-in-possession regulations of § 922, for example, do not only
impact those convicted of state felonies—whose rights may be
restored under the Firearm Owners Protection Act251—but also apply
to federal felons.252 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
Congress has broad power to protect the public from those who
legitimately come into federal custody,253 and Justice Scalia’s Heller
opinion spoke favorably of restrictions on firearms ownership by
convicted felons and the mentally ill.254 There is no clear limiting

248. It is, however, perhaps noteworthy that a recent attempt to increase state gun
rights, the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011, relied on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment for its jurisdiction, not the Commerce Power. See National
Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011, H.R. 822, 112th Cong., § 2 (2011).
249. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (“Our decisions have
recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”
(quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937))).
250. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
252. See Scott Christiansen, Hidden Punishment—In Rural Alaska, Where Gun
Rights Matter Most, There’s No Way for Reformed Felons—Even Non-Violent
Ones—to Get Them Back, ANCHORAGE PRESS, Oct. 28, 2009,
http://www.anchoragepress.com/news/hidden-punishment---in-rural-alaska-wheregun-rights/article_fb2e8d5f-cf56-5a02-a71f-b49935d4573c.html.
253. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (upholding indefinite
federal civil commitment of “sexually dangerous federal prisoner[s]”); see also
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (upholding federal power to
commit persons who “came legally into the custody of the United States” where the
federal authority “is not exhausted”).
254. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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principle on what restrictions the Congress may place on those
otherwise under federal jurisdiction, in the interest of public safety.
In addition, the Second Amendment itself seems to allow Congress
significant power to limit the types of guns that are permitted—
including those that are imported under an undeniably legitimate
exercise of the Congressional power to regulate foreign commerce.
Thus far, Heller has made clear that handguns are protected,255
whereas Miller has held that sawed-off shotguns are not.256 But it is
unclear whether Congress may bar the importation of any types of
weapons, and to the extent such limits could be imposed, there would
likely be some domestic impact.
D. Current Federal Laws that Would Limit the Ability for a
State to Grant Broad Gun Rights Through Its State Constitution
Current federal gun regulations—most notably the National
Firearms Act,257 the Gun Control Act of 1968,258 and the Firearm
Owners Protection Act of 1986259—rely primarily on the Commerce
Power for their claim of federal power. Although all of these laws
pre-date the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the Commerce Power
that began with United States v. Lopez, the Ninth Circuit has—with
the apparent blessing of the Supreme Court—approved broad
authority to regulate the types of arms that any individual can
possess, upholding a federal law that makes it illegal to “transfer or
possess a machinegun”260 that was not lawfully possessed before 1986,
as an exercise of the Commerce Power.261 The Ninth Circuit initially
held that such a restriction exceeded the power of Congress in United
States v. Stewart (Stewart I)262 when applied to machineguns that
were “entirely homemade” and had never moved in interstate
commerce.263 The Supreme Court, however, subsequently vacated

255. See id. at 628-29.
256. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
257. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2006).
258. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2006).
259. Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–926, 926A, 929(a)).
260. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006).
261. See United States v. Stewart (Stewart II), 451 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006).
262. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
263. Id. at 1135. This holding distinguished Stewart I from an earlier case in which
the Ninth Circuit had upheld § 922(o) as applied to weapons that were, in fact,
illegally transferred in interstate commerce—the aptly-named United States v.
Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996).
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this opinion and remanded for reconsideration in light of Gonzales v.
Raich.264 On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed itself, holding that
“Congress had a rational basis for concluding that in the aggregate,
possession of homemade machineguns could substantially affect
interstate commerce,” and banning such possession was therefore
within the Commerce Power.265 This would seem to suggest that there
are few limits on what Congress can do to regulate firearms under the
Commerce Power.
Recent attempts to circumvent the Federal Firearms Act by the
enactment of “Firearms Freedom Acts”—laws that purport to create a
wholly intra-state market for guns and declare it immune from federal
regulations—have attempted to draw a boundary on the breadth of
federal regulatory power over guns. However, the nearly-plenary
nature of federal Commerce Power has been upheld recently in
Montana Shooting Sports Association v. Holder.266 In that case, the
Montana Shooting Sports Association sought a declaratory judgment
that the Montana Firearms Freedom Act267 was effective
notwithstanding Federal firearms laws. The Montana Firearms
Freedom Act, in essence, declared certain firearms manufactured
wholly or almost wholly within the state of Montana to be beyond the
reach of the Federal government under the Commerce Clause.268
Relying heavily on Gonzales v. Raich,269 the District Court found that
“Montana’s attempt to . . . excise a discrete local activity from the
comprehensive regulatory framework provided by federal firearms
laws cannot stand.”270 The court also found that, so long as Congress is
validly exercising its Commerce Power, the Tenth Amendment cannot
bar that exercise.271
Yet on the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressed a
potential interest in rolling back some of Congress’s power to
regulate certain arms, and recently cast doubt on federal laws against
chemical weapons in Bond v. United States.272 Pro-gun organizations
264. See United States v. Stewart (Stewart I), 545 U.S. 1112 (2005).
265. Stewart II, 451 F.3d at 1078.
266. No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 WL 3926029 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010).
267. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101 to -106 (2011).
268. See id.
269. 515 U.S. 1 (2005).
270. Mont. Shooting, 2010 WL 3926029, at *16.
271. See id. at *23.
272. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). Although the actual holding in Bond related to the
standing of individuals to assert the Tenth Amendment as a defense to federal
criminal charges, the underlying issue was the validity of the Chemical Weapons
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have recognized this issue and have submitted briefs on behalf of Ms.
Bond.273 Although the issues underlying Bond have been the subject
of a long-standing academic debate,274 the fact that the Supreme
Court may be poised to invalidate a federal ban on chemical weapons
makes it difficult to predict how it will view federal regulation of
more traditional weapons.275 Or this interplay may allow Congress to
ban the types of guns that they typically regulate, but leave many
activities that are not otherwise regulated under the Commerce
Power—including, apparently, chemical weapons—outside of the
reach of Congress.
And there is considerable factual support for insulating certain
areas of the gun market from federal control. Many weapons
manufacturers are located within U.S. States, including (but by no
means limited to): Alexander Arms, which manufactures .50 Beowulf
rifles (Virginia);276 ArmaLite, which manufactures M16 assault rifles
and the M4 carbine (Illinois);277 Barrett Firearms, which manufactures
sniper rifles and machine guns (Tennessee);278 Bushmaster Firearms,
Convention Implementation Act as an exercise of the federal Treaty Power, pursuant
to Missouri v. Holland. See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2006). Rather than simply remanding for
consideration of the merits, the Supreme Court added in dicta, “[t]he ultimate issue
of the statute’s validity turns in part on whether the law can be deemed ‘necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution’ the President’s Article II, § 2 Treaty Power.
The Court expresses no view on the merits of that argument. It can be addressed by
the Court of Appeals on remand.” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2367. (citations omitted). This
language raises the possibility that the Supreme Court may be poised to reconsider
the broad powers of Congress to legislate under the Treaty Power. See, e.g., Brief for
Amici Curiae of the Cato Institute and the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
Supporting Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee and Reversal, United States v.
Bond, No. 08-2677 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2011).
273. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners Foundation et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 09-1227), 2010 WL
5087869 (arguing that Bond had standing to challenge the Chemical Weapons Act as
exceeding the enumerated powers of Congress).
274. Compare Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005) (arguing that the Treaty Power cannot extend the powers
of Congress), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1075 (2000) (arguing for a broadly construed Treaty Power).
275. Nor is this a mere academic question, insofar as there are states in which the
use of some chemical weapons is expressly legal. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-312
(2012) (“Nothing herein contained shall prevent the use of tear gas or other gases . . .
by any person or persons in the protection of person, life or property.”).
276. See ALEXANDER ARMS, http://www.alexanderarms.com (last visited Sept. 18,
2012).
277. See ARMALITE, INC., http://www.armalite.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
278. See BARRETT, http://www.barrett.net (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
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which manufactures AR-15 pistol and rifle variants (North
Carolina);279 Charter Arms, which manufactures several types of
handguns (Connecticut);280 Colt’s Manufacturing Company, which
manufactures the Colt line of revolvers and rifles (Connecticut);281
Henry Repeating Arms, which manufactures lever action long guns
(New Jersey);282 Hi-Point Firearms, which manufactures low-cost
pistols and carbines (Ohio);283 Kahr Arms, which manufactures semiautomatic pistols (Massachusetts);284 Les Baer, which manufacturers
M1911 pistols and AR-15 rifles (Iowa);285 Olympic Arms, which
manufactures Colt 1911 series pistols and AR-15 and M-16 rifles
(Washington);286 Remington Arms, which makes a number of
handguns, rifles, and shotguns (North Carolina);287 Smith & Wesson,
which manufactures a number of types of firearms (Massachusetts);288
STI International, which manufactures M1911 pistols (Texas);289 and
Taser International, manufacturer of the taser electroshock gun
(Arizona).290 And at least one person has expressed an interest in
manufacturing a gun specifically for intra-state sales and use in
Montana: the Montana Buckaroo, a .22 caliber rifle intended for use
by children.291
If these weapons are only sold in the state and are not fungible with
other, similar weapons (the Montana provision requires every such
279. See BUSHMASTER FIREARMS INT’L, http://www.bushmaster.com (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012).
280. See CHARTER ARMS, http://www.charterfirearms.com (last visited Sept. 18,
2012).
281. See COLT’S MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC, http://www.coltsmfg.com (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012).
282. See HENRY REPEATING ARMS, http://www.henryrepeating.com (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012).
283. See HI-POINT FIREARMS, http://www.hi-pointfirearms.com (last visited Sept.
18, 2012).
284. See KAHR ARMS, http://www.kahr.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
285. See LES BAER CUSTOM, INC., http://www.lesbaer.com (last visited Sept. 18,
2012).
286. See OLYMPIC ARMS, INC., http://www.olyarms.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
287. See REMINGTON ARMS CO., LLC, http://www.remington.com (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012).
288. See SMITH & WESSON, http://www.smith-wesson.com (last visited Sept. 18,
2012).
289. See STI INT’L, INC., http://www.stiguns.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
290. See TASER INT’L, INC., http://www.taser.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
291. See Nathan Koppel, The Battle Over Buckaroo: Suit Challenges Congress’
Right To Regulate Guns, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (July 14, 2011, 8:31 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/07/14/the-battle-over-buckaroo-a-suit-challengescongress-right-to-regulate-guns.
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weapon to be stamped with “Made in Montana”),292 there is at least a
colorable argument that Congress cannot reach them through the
Commerce power.
E. If a State Did Amend Its Constitution, What Deference
Would Other States Have to Pay to Constitutional Provisions of
Sister States on, E.g., Carry Laws?
It is unlikely that any state can have a direct impact on the gun laws
of any other state, although states may form compacts among
themselves (with the consent of Congress)293 to provide reciprocity to
residents of other states, or may unilaterally choose to allow any
person to own a gun without requiring a permit.
Congress may be able to require states to grant reciprocity to
residents of other states. For example, the National Right-to-Carry
Reciprocity Act of 2011 (H.R. 822) recently passed the House of
Representatives.294 Due to the operation of federal preemption, any
state law (or constitutional provision that may be passed) which
forbids the recognition of another state’s permits would be rendered
ineffective. Interestingly, although this would seem to impact
commerce among the several states, the authority cited in the
National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act is actually Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The state constitutions already vary, and neighboring states are
able to legislate in any manner they see fit. In the absence of federal
preemption, it is unlikely that New York could do anything if New
Jersey decided to allow everyone within its borders to carry a loaded
handgun on their person, openly or concealed, at all times.
Congress could, perhaps, impose restrictions though, and attempt
to limit the concealed carry of weapons across state lines. This would
clearly be permissible under the Commerce Power, as Congress
already regulates several areas that involve conduct that crosses state
lines (such as gambling and prostitution, to name two). However,
depending on the nature of the right that courts develop, it may be
found that such a regulation would run afoul of the Second

292. See id.
293. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
294. See Amy Bingham & John Parkinson, House Passes Bill Making Concealed
Carry Permits Valid Across State Lines, ABC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/houses-passes-bill-making-concealedcarry-permits-valid-across-state-lines/.
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Amendment or even the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution.295
CONCLUSION
Even if the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v.
Heller296 and McDonald v. City of Chicago297 failed to produce the
result expected by the gun rights advocates who hailed both cases as
tipping points in their battles against those holding an anti-rights
approach to firearms (pro-gun control), they nonetheless pointed out
scores of issues which gun-rights advocates may take up in the state
constitutional arena. As the federal Constitution is likely impossible
to amend in the current environment, the state constitutions are
perhaps lower-hanging fruit when it comes to the amendment
process, and the ease with which one may “constitutionalize” their
raison d’être. At the very least, this Article looks at the holes left in
the nascent Second Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,
and through a few thought experiments, points out what might be
amongst those states with the desire to offer broad rights to keep and
bear arms. In the face of uncertainty in the scope of a federal right to
bear arms, the old friend of the gun control side of the political
spectrum may just prove to be a new friend to the gun rights side of
the political spectrum. Only time will tell whether the gun rights
advocates can make that dog hunt.

295. Cf. Nelson Lund, Have Gun, Can’t Travel: The Right to Arms Under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 73 UMKC L. REV. 951 (2005).
296. 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008).
297. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).

